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BOOK REVIEW
NOAH BY THE NUMBERS: AN EMPIRICAL
EVALUATION OF THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
NOAH's CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES. By Charles C.
Mann & Mark L. Plummer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1995. 302 pp.
$24.00.
The Endangered Species Act' ("Act") costs, but does not benefit;
it has failed to promote the conservation of biodiversity in the United
States. So say Charles Mann and Mark Plummer in their book Noah's
Choice: The Future of Endangered Species.2 Given the current political cli-
mate, in which cost-benefit analysis has become synonymous with
good government,3 they could hardly have delivered a more damning
judgment. Small wonder that the book has been influential in the
Congress's numerous hearings on reform of the Act.4 Noah's Choice
easily justifies the temporary moratorium that the 104th Congress im-
- Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A., TheJohns Hopkins University, 1988;
MA (Psychology), The Johns Hopkins University, 1988; J.D., Stanford University, 1993;
Ph.D. (Psychology), Stanford University, 1994. This paper benefitted from the invaluable
research assistance of Anne Wahlig. Discussions with Julie Stanier and Ted Schultz also
contributed useful insights.
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
2 CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH's CHOICE: THE FuTURE OF ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES (1995).
3 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1996) (proposing that Congress subject all federal regulations to
cost-benefit balancing).
4 One of the authors has given congressional testimony on the Act. See Reauthoriza-
tion of the Endangered Species Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Drinking Water, Fisheries, and
Wildlife of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter
Act Reauthorization] (statement of Mark L. Plummer, Senior Fellow, Discovery Institute).
Moreover, the book has been favorably cited on three other occasions. See Improving the
Endangered Species Act: Recommended Amendments: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Resources,
104th Cong. 44-45 (1996) (statement of RobertJ. Vincze, Counsel, Mo-Ark Association);
Possible Implications from Estimating Tropical Extinctionsfor Biodiversity Poliy: Hearings Before the
Task Force on the Endangered Species Act of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 46-47
(1995) (statement of Patrick Kangas, Natural Resources Management Program, University
of Maryland); Reforming the Endangered Species Act: The Property Rights Perspective: Hearings
Before the Task Force on Endangered Species Act of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 32-
34 (1995) (statement of Ike C. Sugg, Fellow in Wildlife and Land-Use Policy, Competitive
Enterprise Institute). The book has also been criticized in Congressional testimony. See
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posed on expanding the list of endangered and threatened species, 5
as well as the sweeping revisions proposed by Don Young, a longtime
opponent of the Act and the current Chairperson of the House Corn-
inttee on Resources.6 If the Act does not prevent species extinction,
or otherwise benefit endangered species, then a demonstration that
the Act imposes any social costjustifies its substantial revision or even
repeal. Although Noah's Choice provides a colorful description of the
Act's costs, the book fails to carefully assess its benefits. It portrays an
undisciplined program created by a statute that exaggerates the value
that the general public places on biodiversity. Unfortunately, Mann
and Plummer's case against the Act is based only on anecdotes and
cursory evaluation of evidence of the Act's benefits.
After first observing that Noah's Choice does provide a useful con-
tribution to the literature on the Act, this Article supplies crucial in-
formation missing from Mann and Plummer's critique: an empirical
analysis of the effects of the Endangered Species Act. Careful assess-
ment of the status of species protected by the Act reveals that it does
improve the condition of endangered and threatened ("listed") spe-
cies.7 Although the results of the analysis suggest reforms that could
make the Act more efficient, any revisions should focus on building
upon the Act's success.
I
THE COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT
Noah's Choice puts forth a convincing argument that the Act has a
high social cost. This may seem like a trivial contribution; the Act's
two key provisions, contained in sections 78 and 9,9 appear to have
obvious costs. Section 7 forbids any federal agency from taking any
Act Reauthorization, supr, at 37-48 (statement of Stuart L. Pimm, Professor of Ecology, Uni-
versity of Tennessee).
5 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Recisions for the Department of De-
fense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-6, 1995
U.S.C.CA.N. (109 Stat.) 73, 86. This law, signed by President Clinton in April, 1995, with-
drew all funding from the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") for placing any new species on
either the endangered or threatened lists, as well as for critical habitat determinations, for
the remainder of the government's fiscal year 1995 (ending on September 30, 1995). The
battles between Congress and President Clinton over the federal budget for fiscal 1996
delayed restoring any funding for these activities until May, 1996. John H. Cushman, Jr.,
Moratorium on Protecting Species is Ended, N.Y. TimEs, May 21, 1996, at Al.
6 H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. (1995). This Bill tracks the proposals in Noah's Choice
closely.
7 The Act distinguishes between "endangered" and "threatened" species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532 (6), (20) (1994). In this paper, I refer to both collectively as "listed" species. I
discuss the distinction between the two designations infra notes 108-09, 144-46 and accom-
panying text.
8 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994).
9 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1994).
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action that "is... likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species." 10 As
Mann and Plummer observe, this proscription values the prevention
of extinction over every other federal program, regardless of the pro-
gram's importance or social value." Section 9 forbids private parties,
as well as federal agencies, from "taking"12 any endangered animal
species.' 3 The Act's definitions,' 4 along with regulations promulgated
by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior
("FWS"),15 make it clear that section 9 forbids a whole range of activi-
ties on private property, including development, logging, and farm-
ing.16 These restrictions also apply without regard to the value of
these activities or the costs they impose on private landowners. In
short, making the case that the Act has high social costs should have
been easy.
The history and folklore of the Act, however, suggest that its so-
cial costs are trivial. Consider just two examples, the cases of the snail
darter and the West Indian (Florida) manatee. The discovery of the
snail darter in the Little Tennessee River supported an injunction
under section 7 that halted construction of the Tellico Dam by the
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA").1 7 On the face of it, this looks
like a significant social cost-favoring a small, unknown fish over a
10 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
11 MAN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 25-26.
12 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994) (defining "take" as "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct").
13 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (1994). As to animals, this provision also prohibits import-
ing, possessing, delivering or selling any listed species, as well as violating any regulation
adopted pursuant to section 9. Plants are given lesser protection. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
14 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1994).
'5 The FWS has primary responsibility for implementing the Act. The National
Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") (a sub-division of the Department of Commerce), how-
ever, also has some obligations. It is solely responsible for protecting 18 domestic species
(seven cetaceans, six anadromous fish, one marine fish, and four pinnipeds) and shares
responsibility with the FWS for seven species (six marine turtles and the Gulf sturgeon).
See Office of Protected Resources, Protecting the Nation's Marine Species (visitedJan. 28, 1997)
<http://kingfish.ssp.nmfs.gov/tmcintyr/prot_res.htnl#ES and Recovery>. The FWS has
jurisdiction over the remaining 1,051 domestic species. See Boxscore: Listings and Recovey
Plans as of December 31, 1996 (visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.fis.gov/~rgendspp/box-
score.gif>. This Article, as with most literature on the Act, focuses primarily on the FWS,
because it is responsible for the lion's share of the listed species.
16 An FWS regulation extends section 9 to threatened as well as endangered animal
species. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1995). Another regulation extends the definition of
"take" to include adverse modification of habitat. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995); see also Bab-
bitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995)
(upholding this regulation).
17 See MN& PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 166-69 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
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huge public works project Indeed, the public outcry after the United
States Supreme Court upheld the injunctionl8 resulted in amendment
of the Act.' 9 A subsequent cabinet-level analysis, however, concluded
that the Tellico Dam project was an unnecessary waste of tax dollars.2 0
The dam did not generate any electricity, did not promote flood con-
trol, provided only marginal recreational opportunities, and de-
stroyed hundreds of acres of some of the most valuable farmland in
the world.21 Nevertheless, through a legislative "sleight of hand" by
Tennessee's congressional delegation, the TVA built the dam in spite
of the Act.22 Although the Tellico Dam provided some benefits to an
economically depressed area, its cost exceeded the revenues it ulti-
mately generated in the local community.23 The nation and the com-
munity would have been better off if the TVA had simply handed the
local counties a check in the amount of the price of constructing the
dam, rather than actually building it.24 If the Act's principal impact
on federal activity is to make it more difficult to undertake wasteful
pork barrel projects like the Tellico Dam, it is surely a welcome addi-
tion to the U.S. Code.
The Florida manatee provides anecdotal support for the theory
that section 9 also imposes few social costs.25 During winter, manatees
linger near the surface of the shallow, warm waters off of Florida's
coast-waters they share with -pleasure boaters. 26 Traveling at high
speeds, boaters are unable to spot the lethargic creatures in time to
avoid deadly collisions. Such collisions are so common that nearly all
identified manatees have been scarred by propellers.2 7 As many as
forty manatee deaths each year are directly attributable to boating
accidents,28 amounting to 2.2% of the estimated population of
18 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
19 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7, 92 Stat.
3751, 3752-60 (1978); see also MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 170.
20 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 171.
21 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLicy. NATURE, LAW,
AND Socimy 660-62 (1992).
22 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 171-73.
23 See id. at 174.
24 See id.
25 Unlike the more famous story of the snail darter, Mann and Plummer do not dis-
cuss the manatee.
26 See FLORIDA MANATEE RECoVERY TEAM, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FLORIDA
MANATEE RECoVERY PLAN 14 (1989) [hereinafter MANATEE RECOVERY PLAN].
27 See Steve Liewer, Support Sought for Manatees; National Conference Urges Habitat Aware-
ness, FORT LAUDERDALE SuN-SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 1996, at B1. Propeller scars on manatees are
so common that scientists studying the species use the scar patterns as a basis for identify-
ing individual manatees. See Dail Wilis, Swimming Against Disease; Mystey: Scientists Are Try-
ing to Discover What's Causing a Lung Infection That Has Killed Scores of Manatees off Florida
Since March, BALTiMORE SUN, Apr. 24, 1996, at Al.
28 See MANATEE RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 26, at 13.
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1,800.29 Boaters have taken a heavy toll on the manatees, and recrea-
tional boating represents one of the two prime causes of human-re-
lated mortality in the species.30 Recent steps taken at both federal
and state levels posting and policing speed limits in areas frequented
by the manatee at those times of year when the species is likely to be
present, along with strategic restrictions on the construction of boat-
ing docks,3 ' should provide significant protection for the manatee.
Given the ample availability of non-manatee populated waters for
high-speed boating in Florida, as well as the dangerous nature of the
activity itself, such measures hardly seem costly. Indeed, even if soci-
ety cared nothing for the manatee, it might well take the same steps to
protect unwitting boaters from potentially fatal collisions. In the case
of the manatee, enforcement of the Act arguably has the side benefit
of curtailing a dangerous and excessive behavior.
In addition to anecdotes like the Tellico Dam story, statistics on
the Act's impact on the federal government also support the theory
that it restricts only wasteful activities. In addition to creating a sub-
stantive roadblock, section 7 requires that all federal agencies consult
with the FWS if they believe that their actions may affect any listed
species.3 2 Between 1987 and 1991, among the 73,560 consultations
performed, only 131 involved potential jeopardy to any listed spe-
cies.3 3 Furthermore, only eighteen federal projects were terminated
as a result of the Act.3 4 Although the impact of the Act on private
parties is unknown,3 5 the statistics suggest that cases in which the Act
impedes important, large-scale federal projects are exceptions rather
than the rule.
29 Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, West Indian Manatee
(visited Nov. 15, 1996) <http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/i/a/saaochtml>.
30 See MANATEE RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 26, at 14. Modification of their habitat is
the other cause of the manatee's decline. Id.
31 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.100-.108 (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 370.12(2) (West Supp. 1997);
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62N-22.001 (1995).
32 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
33 This excludes two "mega-consultations" involving pesticides and timber sales. See
Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of
Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 277, 318 (1993) (citing WORLD WIL= FUND,
FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION
PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1992)).
34 See id.
35 Some reports suggest that the Act's effect on private parties may be substantial. See,
e.g., THOMAS LAMBERT, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AM. BUSINESS, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
Aar A TRAIN WRECK AHEAD 7-8 (1995); William P. Pendley, The Endangered Species Ad: The
Pit Bull of Environmental Laws, in Farmers, Ranchers and Environmental Law 169, 17881
(Roger Clegg ed., 1995). A study conducted by the General Accounting Office concluded
that 90% of all listed species have some or all habitat on private land; for 73% of the listed
species, private land accounts for more than 60% of their habitats. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES Acrn INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL
LANDS 4-5 (1994).
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Although they rely largely on anecdotes rather than hard data,
Mann and Plummer construct a persuasive response to the theory that
the Act is costless.3 6 Noah's Choice documents detailed case studies of
instances in which the presence of an endangered species stopped a
valuable public or private project dead in its tracks. To name just a
few examples, the book describes a road needed to provide access to a
hospital for a rural community that was not constructed so as to avoid
disturbing an endangered beetle;37 a community plagued by black
flies that was unable to use an insecticide because of the presence of
an endangered butterfly; 38 and a shopping mall forced to spend
thousands of dollars every year to mow its grass carefully so as to pro-
vide a suitable habitat for the same endangered butterfly.3 9 Case after
case, they record the Act's very real and very human costs. Even if a
massive iceberg does not lurk below the more visible cases like the
snail darter and the manatee, Noah's Choice demonstrates that numer-
ous costly instances of the Act's restrictions do indeed exist.
Of greater value to the debate, however, is the framework Mann
and Plummer build around these anecdotes. They assert that the
Act's effect on the economy is akin to cooking a frog:40 "Drop a frog
in a pot of boiling water.., and it will immediately leap free. But put
that same frog in a pot of cool water and gradually turn up the heat,
and the frog will happily sit and be cooked to death."'41 So too with
the Act. If it prevents the opening of one shopping mall, we do not
notice because the effect on the economy is negligible. One fewer
golf course yields no observable decline in recreational opportunities.
One less road does not significantly hamper transportation. Although
each project delayed or halted may not be significant in and of itself,
Mann and Plummer observe that each does have a cost. One fewer
shopping mall, golf course, or highway translates into an incremental
loss of productivity and greater unemployment, even if it is not easily
observed. Furthermore, the full impact of the Act must consist of the
sum of these lost activities. When one adds up the cost of all of the
lost private and public projects, the sum-total may surprise and alarm,
even if each incremental cost can be justified.
Mann and Plummer's "cooked frog" metaphor is perhaps best il-
lustrated by their discussion of the conflict between development and
36 But see Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENv'T, Summer 1995, at 9, 10-12 (arguing that wasteful public subsidies create the illusion
that protection of biodiversity interferes with economic productivity).
37 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 15-17.
38 Id. at 95-97.
39 Id. at 107.
40 Id. at 85.
41 Id,
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protecting endangered species in Austin, Texas. 42 In the late 1980s
the city found itself choosing between satisfying a boom in the de-
mand for new housing and protecting a sizeable assortment of endan-
gered birds, insects, bats, salamanders, and arachnids.43 As the city's
population began to spill into previously undeveloped countryside,
developers turned their attention to property inhabited by these crea-
tures.44 The Act's restrictions arguably added to the pressure on hous-
ing prices in Austin,45 in that each property the Act removed from
development added another incremental cost to housing in Austin,
for a substantial cumulative impact.
Thus do Mann and Plummer refute the theory that the Act is
costless. But even if the Act generates social costs, it may also create
benefits that make it, on balance, a sensible statute. Mann and Plum-
mer recognize this, and admit that protecting endangered species
may create some benefits.46 They admit that a decline in biodiversity
may result in losses to biotechnology as well as having potentially dis-
astrous effects on ecosystems.47 They also describe the loss in tourism
that some regions might face if they lost their whooping cranes or
California condors.48 Mann and Plummer dismiss these political
losses, however, as trivial, or inapplicable to a single species. They
assert that standard economic analysis cannot provide a sensible value
for any particular species. 49 Ultimately, they conclude that humans
are willing to bear some costs to protect species out of a sense of
moral obligation, for "reasons peculiarly our own."50 This moral com-
pulsion, they argue, is not absolute. It does not require adopting the
so-called "Noah Principle"51 of saving every species. Trade-offs must
be made and some species must be sacrificed to other obligations,
such as providing food and affordable housing. Mann and Plummer
fault the Act for falling to make these trade-offs. They contend that as
a consequence of refusing to make such choices, the Act attempts to
protect species when, in fact, society should rationally decline to do
SO.
5 2
42 Id. at 176-211.
43 Id. at 176-87.
44 Id.
45 Id. Others have described a similar impact of the Act on housing prices and availa-
bility. See LAMBERT, supra note 35, at 8; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Conserving Habitats
and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Develop-
ment, 10 STAN. ENVrT. LJ. 1, 32-86, 39-41 (1991); Katharine Rosenberry, The Effect of the
Endangered Species Act on Housing Construction, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 565-82 (1982).
46 MImANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 119-24.
47 Id. at 128-130.
48 Id. at 126, 131.
49 Id. at 131-32.
50 Id. at 115, 134.
51 Id. at 24-25.
52 Id. at 213-15.
362 [Vol. 82:356
NOAH BY THE NUMBERS
Worse yet, Mann and Plummer claim that the Act does not even
protect endangered species.53 They observe that since the Act's pas-
sage in 1973, only twenty-one species have been removed from the list
of protected species, while 721 have been added.54 Because the stated
goal of the Act is to ensure that species recover and no longer need its
protection,55 this statistic is not inspiring. Furthermore, they assert
that only one of the de-listed species (the American alligator) can-
thank the Act for its resurgence.56 Among the listed species, only
eleven have been re-classified from "endangered" to "threatened" sta-
tus.57 Mann and Plummer attribute only two of these partial successes
to the Act (the Utah prairie dog and the Aleutian Canada goose). 58
As a final bit of evidence, Mann and Plummer cite the FWS's 1992 bi-
annual Report on the Act.59 According to this Report, of the species
listed in 1992, 33% were "declining," 28% were "stable," less than 10%
were "improving," 2% were "extinct," and 28% were of unknown sta-
tus.6 0 After noting that the status of some species would improve even
without the Act, Mann and Plummer reach the "inescapable conclu-
sion . . . [that] the Endangered Species Act has failed to help the
overwhelming majority of species under its care to reach the 'point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer neces-
sary.'"6 1 Thus, according to Mann and Plummer, endangered and
threatened species continue to decline in the United States, despite
the Act.
Mann and Plummer attribute this failure to the Act's adoption of
the Noah Principle. The Act requires the protection of all endan-
gered species regardless of the price. Its goal of saving every listed
species from extinction would cost far more than Congress has histori-
cally been willing to spend on the endangered species program.62
Mann and Plummer argue that the resources devoted to protecting
biodiversity have never, and will never, match the enormity of the
53 Id. at 239-47.
54 Id. at 240.
55 Section 2(b) asserts that: "The purposes of this chapter are... to provide a pro-
gram for the conservation of... endangered species and threatened species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(b) (1994). The Act defines "conservation" as the "use of all methods and proce-
dures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary."
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994).
56 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 241.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 24243.
59 U.S. FISH & WLDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS,
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM 17-20 (1992) [hereinafter FWS
REPORT, 1992], cited in MANN & PLuMMER, supra note 2, at 243.
60 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 243.
61 Id. at 245 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994)).
62 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 214-15.
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task.63 "Noah had it easy," they write, "[t] he materials he needed...
were at hand and the design ... was guaranteed to be sufficient for
the task."64 The United States has no such guarantee and has other
priorities. Given the budget constraints under which species protec-
tion must operate, they argue, trying to preserve everything is a fool-
ish, "optative" goal. 65
Insisting upon reaching the unreachable has two adverse conse-
quences: it inefficiently stretches the resources available to protect
species and disproportionately imposes the burden of protecting spe-
cies on private landowners. As to the first point, Mann and Plummer
echo the conclusions of others. 66 The FWS faces a large backlog of
species awaiting listing67 and receives only a fraction of the funding
necessary to implement recovery efforts. 68 Consequently, unlisted
species submerge into extinction before receiving the Act's protec-
tion6 9 while listed species fail to recover, both because their numbers
have declined too drastically before they first received protection 70
and because their recovery plans remain unfunded.7'
As to the Act's impact on landowners, Mann and Plummer cap-
ture the sentiment and concerns of many when they argue that the
Act's restrictions on private landowners are both counterproductive
and unfair.7 2 Because section 9 can convert a "worthwhile private en-
deavor" into a "potential crime," it gives landowners "great incentive
to ensure that an official endangered species never appear[s] on their
property."73 Rather than providing landowners with positive reasons
to conserve endangered species, they argue, the Act creates perverse
63 Id.
64 Id. at 212.
65 Id. at 209-10.
66 See, e.g., Ann Gibbons, Mission Impossible: Saving All Endangered Species, 256 SCIENCE
1386, 1386 (1992); Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species Act
Doesn't Work-And What to Do About It, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 273, 278-79 (1991).
67 See Houck, supra note 33, at 292-96.
68 See id. at 346-49.
69 The precise number of species that have been lost while awaiting listing is unknown
and probably unknowable, but the FWS reports that at least three candidate species have
gone extinct before being listed. Proposed and Candidate Species Information (visited Nov. 4,
1996) <http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/endcand.html>. The agency cautions, however,
that these species may have been extinct before the Act's passage. Id.
70 See David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the
U.S. Endangered Species List: 1985-1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 88 (1993) (asserting
that when listed, many species have populations too small to ensure long-term survival).
71 See Houck, supra note 33, at 344-51.
72 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 176-211. See also LAMBERT, supra note 35, at 14-
15;John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the Endangered Species Act,
24 ENvrL. L. 501, 561-65 (1994); Pendley, supra note 35, at 181-88; Richard Stone, Incentives
Offer Hope For Habitat; Enforcing the Endangered Species Act with Positive Incentives, 269 SCIENCE
1212, 1212 (1995).
73 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 187.
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incentives for them to destroy suitable habitat. Mann and Plummer
document specific instances of these perverse incentives in action.
For instance, upon being informed that the San Diego mesa mint was
about to be placed on the list of endangered plants, a construction
company immediately cleared a 279-acre tract containing the plant,74
while a development company owned by Ross Perot stripped a 333-
acre site near Austin, Texas, of all juniper and oak to discourage the
endangered golden-cheeked warbler from settling on the property)'5
Although section 5 of the Act allows the FWS to purchase land from
private landowners to preserve habitat,7 6 lack of funds forces the FWS
to rely instead on the restrictions set forth in section 9,77 thereby, in
the words ofJustice Scalia, "conscript[ing land] into national zoologi-
cal use."78 Whereas purchasing habitat would preserve it indefinitely,
leaving it in private hands may subject it to perverse incentives that
destroy the species.
Thus, the Act stands condemned by Mann and Plummer. As writ-
ten, the Act imposes real, tangible social costs in an effort to reach the
unattainable goal of protecting all species and, as a result, makes no
progress towards achieving the more modest, desirable goal of simply
protecting some species. Although others have criticized their book
for falling to propose specific alternatives,?9 Mann and Plummer need
not offer such proposals. Their mission is accomplished once they
reach the conclusion that the Act has no benefits. Costs without bene-
fits are not tolerated in contemporary America, nor should they be.
Mann and Plummer do not pronounce final sentence on the Act, but
given their verdict, repeal is the most obvious reform. Indeed, some
of the reforms they do advocate are tantamount to repeal.80 In partic-
ular, they propose eliminating the FWS regulation that restricts ad-
verse modification of habitat by private landowners and replacing it
with a "national biodiversity trust."8 Moreover, they would withhold
federal eminent domain power from this land trust.8 2 Mann and
74 Id at 187
75 IH at 196-97.
76 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994).
77 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 220.
78 Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407,
2421 (1995) (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
79 Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, The Law and Poliy of.Endangered Species Act
Reauthorization: Noah's Choices and Ecological Mandarins, 25 ENvTL. L. 1281, 1289-90 (1995)
(book review); Deborah Eudene, Book Note, 15 STAN. ENvTL. LJ. 233, 241-43 (1996).
80 Mann and Plummer advocate altering the Act so as to (1) reduce the costs it im-
poses on those who live near endangered species, MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 216-
19; (2) set attainable goals, id. at 219-21; (3) devote more resources to gathering informa-
tion, id. at 221-22; and (4) allow for more localized, political balancing of competing inter-
ests, id. at 222-24.
81 Id. at 227-29.
82 Id. at 228-29.
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Plummer would retain only the Act's prohibition against active hunt-
ing of endangered species-converting the Act into "a kind of glori-
fied anti-poaching law."83
Mann and Plummer's conclusion has the support of an unlikely
collection of economists and conservationists.8 4 Many scholars agree
that the Act's combination of inadequate funding and perverse incen-
tives undermines its ability to protect biodiversity, and argue that
more positive incentives are needed.8 5 The problem with this pro-
nouncement, however, is the weakness of the data used to support it.
If the Act has failed to protect endangered species, then it should be
scaled down to more realistic goals. To conclude that the Act is failing
simply because more species have been identified as endangered than
have been identified as having recovered, however, is misguided.
Even Mann and Plummer's use of the detailed data in the 1992 FWS
Report on the Act is misleading.8 6 Throughout their book, Mann and
Plummer rely on carefully conducted research, except when the topic
turns to the effectiveness of the Act in preserving species. Indeed,
they relegate this section to an appendix, 7 suggesting that they do
not regard the issue as critical. Yet clearly it is. If the Act has stemmed
a tide of extinction, then reform must proceed with caution lest the
valuable aspects of the Act be lost, and repeal can be justified only by a
demonstration that our society has withdrawn from its commitment to
preserving biodiversity.
In their analysis of whether the Act works, Mann and Plummer
commit two critical errors. First, they fail to determine the Act's mar-
ginal impact on biodiversity. Even if 721 more species are endan-
gered today than in 1973, in order to assess the Act's impact on
endangered species, one must ask how many more would have been
endangered or even extinct if the Act had never become law. Second,
their description of the data provides a snapshot of biodiversity, but
their conclusions require a short video. Data on the present status of
species provide little indication of biodiversity trends. Unfortunately,
Mann and Plummer overlook a wealth of data available on the status
of endangered species. In the remainder of this Article, I examine
some of these data. A thorough analysis supports the conclusion that,
contrary to Mann and Plummer's appraisal, the Act does benefit en-
83 Id. at 227.
84 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 72, at 1212. See also NAnONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCI-
ENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 4 (1995) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (giving the Act
high marks for adherence to scientific principles, but only lukewarm support for the Act's
power to facilitate species recovery).
85 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
86 The National Research Council analyzed these data as well, but argued that the
FWS's statistics were inconclusive. NRC REPORT, supra note 84, at 197.
87 MAN & PLumjER, supra note 2, app. at 243-45.
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dangered species. The data also suggest that some relatively minor
improvements in the implementation of the Act could make it more
efficient, thereby protecting more species for the same investment.
II
THE PRESENT STUDY
Mann and Plummer's superficial analysis could easily have over-
looked important benefits generated by the Act. The present study
used data published by the FWS and available in the Federal Register
to identify trends in the viability of listed species over time and under
different circumstances, thereby creating a more detailed assessment
of the Act's impact on biodiversity.
A. Methodology and Hypotheses
The 1988 amendments to the Act require the FWS to generate
biannual reports on the endangered species program,88 and the
Agency has done so for 1990, 1992, and 1994.89 The data on listed
species contained in these reports served as the basis for the present
analysis. The reports describe several variables for each species, in-
cluding the listing designation (endangered or threatened); whether
or not critical habitat has been designated; whether or not a recovery
plan has been adopted; the recovery priority of the species;90 whether
the recovery efforts for that species conflict with economic develop-
ment; and most importantly, the current status of each species' popu-
lation (improving, stable, declining, extinct, or unknown).
This last variable, population status, was the primary target of the
present analysis. Even though a species remains listed as endangered
or threatened, if its population is currently improving, then the Act
may claim some measure of success. Likewise, even the status of "sta-
ble" may represent a turnaround from the decline that caused the
species to be listed. A species' status is thus a more refined measure of
88 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-478, § 1003, 102
Star. 2806, 2306-07 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (3) (1994)).
89 U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR REPORT TO CONGRESS,
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM (1990) [hereinafter FWS RE-
PORT, 1990]; FWS REPORT, 1992, supra note 59; U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE INTERIOR REPORT TO CONGRESS, RECOVERY PROGRAM, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED
SPECIES (1994) [hereinafter FWS REPORT, 1994]. At present, the 1994 Report is the most
current, having been issued in late 1995.
90 The FWS combines three variables into a single numerical value to describe recov-
ery priority
. 
degree of threat (high, moderate, and low), recovery potential (high or low),
and taxonomy (monotypic genus, species, and subspecies). FWS REPORT, 1990, supra note
89, at 8. The FWS also considers the existence of an economic conflict with recovery ef-
forts to be part of its recovery priority system, but such a conflict does not alter its priority
number. Id. In the present analysis, economic conflicts were considered separately from
recovery priority.
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the Act's impact on biodiversity than the mere fact of its presence on
the list of endangered and threatened species. This variable admit-
tedly has been criticized by the National Research Council as being
too subjective.91 It is not clear when an increase in population size
constitutes "improvement" or how long a population must remain
constant to be considered "stable."92 Ultimately these designations
represent the subjective judgment of the "FWS, and may only imper-
fectly reflect a given species' true condition. Furthermore, as Mann
and Plummer observe, for some species improvement might not be
the product of the Act's protection,93 or might not represent true pro-
gress towards recovery.94 Despite these problems, across the 891 spe-
cies described in the 1994 Report, species status should correlate with
the actual condition of species. Noise and error in the data may ob-
fuscate small effects, but strong, accurate trends nevertheless should
emerge, if they exist.
The Act creates three types of protection for endangered species.
First, the Act protects all listed species from harm caused by the ac-
tions of federal agencies under section 7, and protects animal species
from being harmed by private parties under section 9.95 Second, once
a species is listed, the FWS is charged with designating its "critical
habitat,"96 which is then protected from federal agencies.97 Finally,
the FWS is supposed to adopt a "recovery plan": a series of actions
designed to spur improvements in the species' population. 98 In the
present analysis, data on species status were used to illuminate the
benefits of each of these three aspects of the Act.
The status of all species provides some indication of the impact of
listing a species. In 1992, the FWS reported that only 38% of all listed
species were known to be stable or improving-a statistic that Mann
and Plummer use to condemn the Act.99 The status of the listed spe-
cies in any given year is worth noting, but may not say much about the
effectiveness of the Act. Of greater significance is any change in this
91 NRC REPORT, supra note 84, at 197-98.
92 Id
93 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 244-45.
94 This is the case for the pahrump poolfish, which is classified as improving.
Although the species is in better condition than in 1975, when its only remaining habitat
was drained, the entire population currently inhabits an artificial tank fed by an artesian
well. id at 244.
95 Plant species are protected to a lesser extent than animals. Plants are not com-
pletely protected from private parties under section 9, unless they are on federal land. 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994).
96 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (A) (1994). See also 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (1994) (defining
critical habitat).
97 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
98 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1994).
99 MANN & PLuMMER, supra note 2, at 243 (relying upon statistics in the FWS RZEPORT,
1992).
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percentage between the three FWS reports, but even this may be mis-
leading. In 1990, the FWS reported that 82% of those species listed
for less than one year were declining,100 indicating that newly listed
species are doing quite poorly. Continuously adding new species may
therefore mask any beneficial impact that the Act has on species over
time.' 0 ' Several comparisons designed to avoid this problem are de-
scribed in this study: the status of species in 1990 versus the status of
these same species in 1994;102 the status of those species listed for less
than one year in 1994 versus the status of all other species in 1994;
and the status of each species at the time it was listed'0 3 versus its
current status.
As a further means of determining the effects of listing, the pres-
ent analysis compared the length of time that each species has been
listed to each species' reported status.' 04 In its 1994 report, the FWS
concluded that the length of time that a species has remained under
the Act's protection correlates positively with species status. 10 5 Specifi-
cally, the FWS observed that 58% of those species listed for twenty
years or more have stable or improving populations, as opposed to
44% of those species listed for four to twenty years, and 22% of those
species listed for less than four years.106 The FWS reported similar
statistics in 1990.107 The present analysis relies upon a more refined
methodology designed to determine the precise relationship between
the number of years listed and species status.
100 FWS REPORT, 1990, supra note 89, at 17. This statistic is not surprising in light of
the fact that placing a species on the list requires that the FWS determine that it is in
"danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range .... " 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6) (1994).
101 The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the listing of new species. Some of this
increase resulted from the settlement of a suit by environmental groups in 1992, in which
the FWS agreed to step up the listing process. See Kunich, supra note 72, at 534-35 &
nn.105-09.
102 Such a comparison was also used to estimate the status of species that had an un-
known status-because further research by the FWS between 1990 and 1994 might have
revealed the condition of some of the species that had an unknown status in 1990.
103 The species status at the time of listing is frequently reported in the final rule
adding the species to the endangered or threatened lists, published in the Federal
Register.
104 The data in the 1994 FWS Report does not include the length of time a species has
been listed. This variable was obtained from dates provided in the 1990 FWS Report, and
from the date of the final rule listing the species published in the Federal Register. Species
listed before 1973 were treated as if they were listed in 1973, because that year marks the
initiation of the program described in this paper. Although the Act itself dates back to
1967, the original statute provided no protection for endangered species.
105 FWS REPORT, 1994, sura note 89, at 32.
106 Id. at 33.
107 In its 1990 Report, the FWS stated that 82% of those species listed less than one
year were in decline, as opposed to 39% of those listed between one and seven years, 32%
of those listed between seven and fifteen years, and 30% of those listed for more than
fifteen years. FWS REPORT, 1990, supra note 89, at 17.
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The present analysis also includes a comparison of those species
listed as "threatened" with the status of those species listed as "endan-
gered." The FWS designates a species as "threatened" rather than "en-
dangered" when it has determined that it is not in immediate danger
of extinction. 108 Because virtually the same restrictions apply to both
groups, 0 9 threatened species should generally be in better condition
than endangered ones. 10
In addition, the present study should resolve some of the uncer-
tainty over the impact on listed species of designating their critical
habitats. Section 7(a) (2) forbids federal agencies from taking any ac-
tion that is likely to "result in the destruction or adverse modification
of.. ." critical habitats."' Because federal agencies are already for-
bidden from taking actions that would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any listed species under section 7, and are forbidden from
taking any species under section 9 (which includes adverse modifica-
tion of habitat1 2), a designation of critical habitat may add only a
trivial level of protection.113 The controversy that designating critical
habitat inspires, however, suggests that its impact is broader than it
108 Threatened species refers to "any species which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future .... " 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1994).
109 The protections against federal agencies outlined in section 7 apply to both endan-
gered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (1994). The restrictions against private
parties created by section 9, on its face, extends only to endangered animal species, 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994), but through regulations adopted pursuant to section 4(d), 16
U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994), the FWS has extended section 9 to apply to threatened animal
species as well. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1995). Consequently, the only practical effect of a dif-
ferent listing designation is that the FWS may, pursuant to section 4(d), allow limited tak-
ings of threatened species if it finds that such takings would further the recovery of the
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994); see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir.
1985).
110 In theory, a similar comparison could have been made between plant and animal
species, which would indicate some measure of success of section 9's restrictions on private
parties. Because this restriction applies only to animals, one might have predicted that
animals would be in better condition overall than plants. Alternatively, if plants and ani-
mals are in a similar condition, or if plants are in better condition, one might conclude
that section 9 has little or no effect, or even has some perverse effects. However, plants
and animals differ in numerous ways in addition to section 9 protection. Routes of recov-
ery and life cycles generally vary dramatically between the kingdoms. Furthermore, other
research has shown that when they are listed, plants are far closer to extinction than ani-
mals. Wilcove et al., supra note 70, at 89. These factors conspire to make cross-kingdom
comparisons uninterpretable. Nevertheless, this paper reports such a comparison. See in-
fra note 146 and accompanying text. As to other kingdoms of species, the Act protects only
plants and animals. Although older taxonomic schemes categorize all species as either
plants or animals, many modem systems use additional categories for protists, fungi, and
monera. NRC REPORT, supra note 84, at 50. No species fitting into one of these newer taxa
is currently listed, and it is not clear that the Act protects such species. Id.
111 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
112 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995).
1"3 James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 14 HARv. ENvrL L. REv. 311, 339-42 (1990).
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seems." 4 Because it is conceptually easier to enforce, section 7's pro-
hibition against the destruction of critical habitats may have more im-
pact than the other restrictions.115
Although the Act requires that the FWS designate critical habitat
at the same time it lists a species," 6 the Agency has in fact designated
critical habitat for only a fraction of all listed species." 7 Comparing
the status of those species with designated critical habitat to the status
of those without it should isolate the impact of designation. As with
listing, the benefits of critical habitat may be observable only after a
few years have passed. To incorporate this possibility into the analysis,
the relationship between the length of time that critical habitat has
been designated and the status was determined for each listed
species." 8
The final layer of protection afforded by the Act, the species re-
covery plan, may also influence species status. The Act requires that
the FWS draft recovery plans for all listed species, unless doing so
would "not promote the conservation of the species."" 9 Although the
restrictions outlined in sections 7 and 9 are designed to arrest the
decline of the listed species, most require some form of affirmative
action to attain a population size sufficient to ensure their long-term
survival. Recovery plans are supposed to outline the actions that
would, if taken, facilitate such a recovery. The actual impact of recov-
ery plans, however, is uncertain. The plans have been criticized for
being vague and for failing to set recovery goals that ensure species
survival.' 20 Furthermore, the steps proposed in the plans often re-
main untaken,' 21 as far less money is available for species recovery
plans than is needed to implement them. 22 In the present analysis,
the effect of recovery plans was assessed in much the same way as the
effects of critical habitat. The status of those species with plans was
114 See Houck, supra note 33, at 307-08.
115 See id. at 310-11.
116 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (3) (A) (1994). The FWS may decline to designate critical
habitat for any species if doing so would not be "prudent," meaning that such a designa-
tion would only encourage people to collect or vandalize individual members of the spe-
cies. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a) (1) (1995). The FWS may be relying on the "prudence"
exception far more than is justified. See Houck, supra note 33, at 303-07.
117 See Houck, supra note 33, at 301.
118 None of the three FWS Reports lists the length of time that critical habitat has been
designated. This was determined from the publication date of the final rule designating
critical habitat in the Federal Register.
119 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (1994).
120 See Timothy H. Tear et al., Status and Prospets for Success of the Endangered Species Act:
A Look at Recoveay Plans, 262 SCIENCE 976, 976 (1993).
121 See Houck, supra note 33, at 345-47.
122 See id. at 347.
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compared to the status of those species without plans. 123 Finally, the
combined effect of recovery plans and critical habitat designation was
assessed as well.
The existence of a conflict between economic development and a
species' conservation efforts may harm species status. Because the Act
sides with species against economic activity, such conflicts should have
no effect on species status. The extent to which species facing eco-
nomic pressures fare worse than those that do not, is an indicator of
the extent to which the Act fails. To address this, the status of species
facing economic conflicts was compared to the status of those that do
not face such conflicts. This analysis was also performed separately for
species that have critical habitat designated and species that do not,
and again for species that have recovery plans and species that do not,
in an effort to determine whether either program alleviates any of the
adverse impacts of economic conflict.
The comparisons performed in this study on listing designation,
critical habitat, recovery plan, and economic conflict required some
further control, because these parameters were not randomly assigned
to species. Two variables were available as controls: the priority given
to a species and the length of time a species has been listed.' 24 As to
priority, it might be the case that, for example, species that had criti-
cal habitat designated also had a higher priority. Species with a
higher priority may have received greater resources, and hence may
be doing better. Thus, any improvements observed among species
with critical habitat may be attributable to greater resources being de-
voted to them, rather than to their having designated critical habitat.
Preliminary analysis, however, revealed that this was simply not the
case. 125 Of greater concern is the number of years of protection, be-
cause this variable has already been demonstrated to affect species sta-
tus. 126 If species that had critical habitat were also listed longer than
those without it, then any observed benefits of critical habitat may
have resulted simply from differences in the length of time that spe-
123 Unfortunately, the date of implementation of the recovery plans was not available,
making it impossible to analyze the effects of time under a recovery plan on listed species.
124 As noted, the length of time that a species has been listed is of interest in its own
right. This paragraph and the analysis it describes merely express the concern that other
observed effects might have resulted solely from the influence of this important variable.
125 Species with an unknown status were assigned slightly more priority than the other
species, although the difference was only marginally significant t(564) = 1.81, p < .10. The
mean priority differed between the species with a different status (excluding extinct spe-
cies and those with an unknown status). KX2, 557) = 20.20, p < .001. This effect resulted
primarily from species that were in decline, which had a higher priority than those that
were stable or improving. Because the species that were in the worst condition were given
the highest priority, it could not be the case that species improvement resulted from being
given higher priority. Thus, there was no further need to control for this variable in any of
the remaining analyses.
126 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
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cies were listed. To account for these effects, analyses to control for
these two variables were performed. 127
Finally, the present study describes the number of species that are
known to have become extinct since the Act was passed. These spe-
cies obviously represent an important failure of the Act and thus merit
special attention. Likewise, species that have recovered sufficiently to
justify their removal from the lists of endangered and threatened spe-
cies mark an important success of the statute, and are described
herein as well.
B. Results
1. The Effects of Listing Species
Table I depicts the status of the listed species in each of the three
FWS Reports. The Table shows the raw number of listed species of
each status and the percentage of all listed species accounted for by
each status for each of the three FWS reports.'28 The last set of col-
127 These effects were controlled by calculating the semi-partial correlation between
the variables of interest (listing designation, kingdom, critical habitat, recovery plan, and
economic conflict) and species status. Partialed out from this statistic was the effect of the
control variables (number of years of protection and priority given to species). The semi-
partial correlation was calculated by running two regression analyses: one that included
only the control variables and one that included the control variables and the variable of
interest. The semi-partial correlation was equal to the total variance explained by the sec-
ond regression minus the variance explained by the first. To the extent that there was
multi-colinearity between the variables of interest and the control variables, this analysis
attributed the apparent influence of the control variables on species status entirely to those
variables, and hence was an extremely conservative analysis as to variables of interest. The
method is described in JACOB COHEN & PATRICIA COHEN, APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/
CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SciENCEs 79-177 (2d ed. 1983). The fact that
the dependent variable was an ordinal parameter with no obvious metric (i.e., the catego-
ries of species status had a clear ranking, but were not necessarily spaced equally) added
further complexity. To account for this in the primary analysis, non-parametric statistics
were used. To account for this in the analysis of the control variables, two binary variables
were created and analyzed. The first was coded as "zero" for species in decline, and as
"one" for species that were stable or improving (species that were extinct or had an un-
known status were coded as "missing"). The second was coded as "zero" for species that
were stable, and "one" for species that were improving (all other species were coded as
"missing"). The semi-partial regression analysis described was run separately on each of
these two binary variables. Although a logistic or probit regression is technically more
appropriate than a conventional regression, the correction that these models offer is small
in the case of the ratios being analyzed in these data. Hence, a conventional model was
used for its analytic simplicity.
128 Table 1 and all further analyses excluded 59 species from the 894 described in the
1994 Report. The American alligator was excluded because the species is listed only be-
cause of its similar appearance to the American crocodile, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1995); the
bidens cuneate because no information was reported about the species (the plant was later
de-listed after the FWS determined that it is not a distinct taxonomic group, Endangered
and Threatened Wildlife and plants; Final Rule to Delist Bidens cuneata (cuneate bidens),
a Hawaiian Plant, 61 Fed. Reg. 4372 (1996) (to be codified at 50 C.FR. § 17.12(h)); Davis'
green pitaya cactus because it was included twice, and all 56 clam species. The clams were
excluded because their data differed so dramatically from that of the other species. Only a
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umns depicts the percentages excluding those species with an un-
known status. Table 1 does little to dispel Mann and Plummer's
diagnosis.129 Fewer than 10% of all listed species were known to be
improving, while for each reporting year most species listed were
either declining or had an unknown status. Excluding those species
with an unknown status revealed that roughly half of all known listed
species populations were declining or extinct; the other half were
mostly stable and only about one in eight species with a known status
was improving. Table 1 documents little improvement over the four-
year period between the Reports. Statistical analysis revealed that the
distributions of species status in both 1992 and 1994 did differ signifi-
cantly' 30 from the distribution in 1990,131 but this effect resulted
largely from a rise in the number of species with an unknown status.
With unknown species excluded, no differences between any of the
three reports were observed. 3 2
TABLE 1: STATUS OF LISTED SPECIES IN 1990, 1992, AND 1994
Percent of Percent of
Number of Species Total Species Known SpeciesPopulation - -
Status 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994
Improving 56 68 76 10.4 10.2 9.1 12.9 14.2 18.4
Stable 181 201 236 33.5 30.1 28.3 41.8 42.1 41.5
Declining 188 198 248 34.8 29.6 29.7 43.4 41.4 43.7
Extinct 8 11 8 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.8 2.3 1.4
Unknown 108 190 267 20.0 28.4 32.0 - - -
Total 541 668 835 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
single species of clams was known to be improving, forty-seven species were in decline,
three were extinct, and five had an unknown status. In other words, among clam species
with a known status (excluding the extinct species), 97.9% were in decline. The percent-
ages of known species in decline among the other groups were: mammals, 42.5%; birds,
35.4%; reptiles, 42.9%; amphibians, 50.0%; fish, 38.0%; snails, 38.9%; crustaceans, 44.4%;
insects, 38.9%; arachnids (all four species had an unknown status); and plants, 49.3%.
Including clam species in the analysis makes all listed species appear to be in overall worse
condition, has a particularly greater impact on animal species, and makes species without
critical habitat appear to be in worse condition (none of the clam species have critical
habitat designated). Otherwise, the clam species do not affect the analysis in any signifi-
cant way. Although it is not clear why clams fared so poorly, as to the clam species at least,
the Act has been a dismal failure.
129 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 243. Mann and Plummer only relied upon the
data in the 1992 Report, but, as noted, there were no real differences seen between the
1992 and 1994 Reports, see infra note 131.
130 Throughout this paper, the words "significant," "significantly," and "significance"
denote only a statistically reliable result and do not indicate the import of the results.
131 The distribution differed significantly between 1990 and 1992, X2(4) = 12.30, p <
.025, and between 1990 and 1994, e'(4) = 24.25, p < .001, but not between 1992 and 1994,
X2(4) = 3.79, p > .40.
132 The j2(3) statistics for all three comparisons were less than 1.60, p's > .5.
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As for species that appeared in both the 1990 and 1994 Reports,
there was a slight trend towards improvement 33 As shown in Table
2, among the 445 species with a known status in both years, 5% more
were deemed stable or improving in 1994.134 The difference between
the two years was not significant, either with or without unknown spe-
cies included in the analysis.' 3 5
TABLE 2: STATUS OF SPECIES LISTED IN BOTH 1990 AND 1994
All Species Listed Species With Known
in Both Years Status in Both Years
Population Number Percent Number Percent
Status 1990 1994 1990 1994 1990 1994 1990 1994
Improving 52 68 9.8 12.8 49 62 12.0 15.1
Stable 179 197 33.6 37.0 172 181 42.0 44.1
Declining 187 171 35.2 32.1 183 160 44.6 39.0
Extinct 6 8 1.1 1.5 6 7 1.5 1.7
Unknown 108 88 20.3 16.5 - - - -
Total 532 532 100.0 100.0 410 410 100.0 100.0
Comparison of the 1990 and 1994 data also provided an estimate
of the status of unknown species. Of the 108 species with an unknown
status in 1990, thirty-four (31.5%) had a known status in 1994. One of
these was extinct. Among the remaining thirty-three, eleven (33.3%)
were declining, sixteen (48.5%) were stable, and six (18.2%) were im-
proving. The differences between this distribution of species status
and those of all species from 1990 and 1994 were both marginally
significant. 3 6 However, this effect resulted from the fact that many
133 The 1990 Report included data on 581 species. Removing the 40 clam species left
541. Among the remaining species, the FWS de-listed four before the 1994 Report (one
plant was determined not to be a distinct taxonomic group; two other plants were deter-
mined not to be in danger of extinction; and one bird, the dusky seaside sparrow, was
removed due to extinction), and nine distinct population listings in the 1990 Report were
consolidated into fewer listings in the 1994 Report (two jaguarundi, three American pere-
grine falcon, two pelican, and two sea turtle populations, all listed separately in the 1990
Report, were consolidated into one listing each in the 1994 Report). Conversely, the
American eagle and the topminnow were listed as one entry in the 1990 Report, and as two
entries in the 1994 Report. Both 1994 listings for each of these two species were retained
in the data. Bidens cuneate was also excluded from the analysis. See supra note 128. Fi-
nally, the dugong was listed in the 1990 Report, but not the 1994 Report-it has always
been regarded by the FWS as a foreign species, despite some domestic appearances in the
U.S. Trust Territories. After these adjustments, 532 species appearing in both Reports
were retained in the analysis.
134 An additional two species (the Guam broadbill and the Maryland darter) were de-
clared extinct, but not removed, during the four-year period. Both were probably extinct
before 1990. FWS REPORT, 1990, supra note 89, at 110, 198.
135 Including unknown species, X2(4) = 6.04, p> .15; without unknown species, j'(3) =
3.37, p > .25.
136 As compared to 1990, e(2) = 4.98, p < .08; as compared to 1994, X2(2) = 5.06, p <
.08. Note that because of the small sample size, the extinct species had to be excluded
from the analysis to provide an accurate statistical test.
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more of these species were found to be improving than in the general
population of known species. Thus, it is not accurate to assume that
the unknown species are largely in decline.
Just as in the 1990 Report, 8 7 newly listed species in the 1994 Re-
port were in worse condition than the other species. Among the 147
species listed for less than one year, 56.5% had an unknown status,
none were extinct, 29.3% were declining, 13.6% were stable, and
0.7% were improving. This is in contrast to the status of the 688 spe-
cies listed for more than one year, 26.7% of which had an unknown
status, 1.2% were extinct, 29.8% were declining, 31.4% were stable,
and 10.9% were improving. Figure 1 makes this comparison among
species with a known status that were not extinct. Among these spe-
cies, 67.2%, 31.3%, and 1.6% of the 64 species listed for less than one
year were declining, stable, and improving, respectively. This distribu-
tion of species status differed significantly from that among the 496
species that were listed longer than one year and had a known status,
41.3%, 43.6%, and 15.1% of which were declining, stable, and improv-
ing, respectively.13 8
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The original Federal Register listing indicated the initial status of
234 of the 835 (28%) species described in the 1994 Report. Exclud-
ing the three extinct species with an unknown status, 94.8%, 3.5%,
and 1.7% of species were declining, stable, and improving, respec-
tively, at the time they were listed. To facilitate a comparison among
the same species, all species with either an unknown or extinct status
in either 1994 or at the time they were listed were then excluded from
the analysis, leaving 400 species. This revealed that as compared to
their status in 1994 (49.3%, 37.5%, and 13.4% were declining, stable,
and improving, respectively), these species demonstrated substantial
137 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
138 X2(2 ) = 18.27, p < .001. Significantly more of the new species listed for less than
one year were of an unknown status (83 out of 147, or 56.4%) than were the species listed
for more than one year (184 out of 688, or 26.7%). e2(1) = 49.18, p < .001.
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improvement (94.3%, 3.5%, and 2.5% declining, stable, and improv-
ing, respectively),139 as shown in Figure 2 below.
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Analysis of the number of years listed reveals that a species with a
better population status was, on average, listed significantly longer.140
Improving populations were listed longer than those with stable popu-
lations, and those with stable populations were listed longer than
those with declining populations.141 Specifically, species that were de-
clining, stable, and improving were listed for an average of 8.2, 10.6,
and 12.9 years, respectively. Figure 3 depicts this relationship in an-
other way, showing the proportion of species in decline by the
number of years of protection received. As can be seen from the re-
gression line imposed on the graph, a steady improvement was ob-
served. For each year of protection, a species was 1.5% more likely to
be stable or improving as opposed to declining. 42 Although it is not
shown graphically, species were also 0.9% more likely to be improving
than stable for each year they are listed.143
139 j2(2) = 200.94, p > .001. The percentage of species with an unknown status at the
time of listing (234 out of 835, or 28.0%) did not differ significantly from the percentage
of species with an unknown status in 1994 (267 out of 835, or 32.0%). X2(1) = 0.40, p> .5.
140 This analysis was performed only on species with an improving, stable, or declining
status, and the result was statistically significant. (2, 557) = 16.61, p < .001. A separate
analysis revealed that species with an unknown status tended to be listed for less time (5.1
years) than species with a known status (9.9 years). t(586) = 10.30, p < .001. Extinct species
were listed for a mean of 15.5 years.
141 These differences were determined to be statistically significant through post hoc
analysis (Tukey's HSD) of the ANOVA reported in supra note 140.
142 This was determined by regressing the binary variable that distinguished declining
species from stable and improving species on the number of years that species were listed.
This regression was significant (F(1, 558) = 26.55, p< .001) and yielded a beta coefficient of
0.015 for years of protection. This result means that each year of protection reduced the
percentage of declining species by 1.5 percentage points and increased the percentage of
improving and stable species by a like amount.
143 This was determined by regressing the binary variable that distinguished stable
from improving species on the number of years that species were listed. This regression,
too, was significant, 1l, 310) = 6.25, p < .025, and yielded a beta coefficient of 0.009.
Unlike the beta coefficient for the previous regression, this statistic was not directly inter-
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Species listed as "endangered" were in worse shape than those
listed as "threatened." Of the 418 species listed as endangered that
were not extinct and had a known status, 46.9% were in decline,
39.2% were stable, and 13.9% were improving, as opposed to 36.6%,
50.7%, and 12.7%, respectively, of the 142 threatened species. This
difference was statistically significant.'4 Even though endangered
species were listed longer, on average, than threatened species, this
did not account for the differences in status between the two
groups. 145 As noted, differences between the plants and animals were
ambiguous. 46
pretable into a change in the overall distribution among the species that were declining,
stable, and improving, because this regression only describes the relationship between spe-
cies that were stable and improving.
144 x2(2) = 5.95, p < .025. The 11 species determined to be extinct were all listed as
endangered. A significantly greater proportion of the endangered species had an un-
known status (224 out of 650 species, or 34.5% of all species) than of the threatened spe-
cies (45 out of 185 species, or 23.2%). j2(1) = 8.38, p < .01.
145 Among species that had a known status and were not extinct, endangered species
were listed for an average of 10.3 years, and threatened species were listed for an average
of 8.7 years-a significant difference. t(289) = 2.56, p < .025. The semi-partial correlation
for the effect of listing designation, controlled for the number of years that species were
listed, on the binary variable that distinguished declining species from stable and improv-
ing species was .019, and was significant. F(1, 605) = 12.14, p < .001. The semi-partial
correlation for the effect of listing designation, controlled for the number of years that
species were listed, on the binary variable that distinguished between stable and improving
species was .002, and was marginally significant. F(1, 310) = 0.63, p > .50.
146 The comparison between the two kingdoms yielded a complex pattern of results.
Among species with a known status that were not extinct, 49.3%, 38.3%, and 12.4% of the
290 plants were declining, stable, and improving, respectively, versus 38.9%, 46.8%, and
13.6% of the 270 animal species. These distributions differed significantly. j 2(2) = 6.16, p
< .05. A smaller percentage of animals (75 out of 354, or 21.9%) than of plants had an
unknown status. X2(1) = 82.65, p < .001. When the length of time that species were listed
was controlled for, however, this difference disappeared. Animals were protected for sig-
nificantly longer than plants (13.2 versus 6.8 years, respectively). t(459) = 12.08, p < .001.
The semi-partial correlation for the effect of kingdom, controlled for the number of years
that species were listed, on the binary variable that distinguished declining species from
stable and improving species was zero. The semi-partial correlation for the effect of king-
dom, controlled for the number of years that species were listed, on the binary variable
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2. The Effects of Critical Habitat
Only 110 species in the database had critical habitat designated
(13.2%). As shown in Figure 4, among those species that were not
extinct and had a known status, 45.9%, 40.1%, and 14.0% of the 479
species without critical habitat were declining, stable, and improving,*
respectively, as opposed to 34.6%, 54.3%, and 11.1% of the 81 species
with critical habitat. Designating critical habitat shifted 11% of spe-
cies from declining to stable. This difference was only marginally sig-
nificant, 147 but persisted even when the length of time that species
were listed was controlled for.148
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Of those species that did have critical habitat designated, the
length of time it had been designated did not generally differ by spe-
cies status. Species that were declining had enjoyed critical habitat
designation for a mean of 9.6 years, as opposed to 10.7 years and 12.9
years for species that were stable or improving, respectively. This
trend, however, was not significant.' 49
that distinguished between stable and improving species was .006, and was not significant.
F(1, 309) = 1.90, p> .10.
147 X2(2) = 5.77, p< .10. Of the eight extinct species, two had critical habitat. Aslightly
greater proportion of the species without critical habitat had an unknown status (240 out
of 728, or 33.0%) than did those with critical habitat (27 out of 110, or 24.6%), but this
difference was not statistically significant. X
2(1) = 3.12, p < .10.
148 Among species that had a known status and were not extinct, those with critical
habitat were listed longer (12.6 years) than those without critical habitat (9.4 years).
t(143) = 5.05, p < .001. The semi-partial correlation for the effect of critical habitat, con-
trolled for the number of years that species were listed, on the binary variable that distin-
guished declining species from stable and improving species was .003, and was not
significant. F(1, 560) = 1.76, p > .10. The semi-partial correlation for the effect of critical
habitat, controlled for the number of years that species were listed, on the binary variable
that distinguished between stable and improving species was .009, and was marginally sig-
nificant. R1, 309) = 2.86, p < .10.
149 1(2, 78) = 1.45, p > .20. The two extinct species with critical habitat had it for a
mean of 12.0 years, and the 27 species with an unknown status with critical habitat had it
for a mean of 12.3 years.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
3. The Effects of Recovery Plans
Species recovery plans had been adopted for 598 (71.6%) of all
listed species and had yet to be adopted for another 220 (26.6%). For
the remaining seventeen species (2.0%), the FWS had determined
that a recovery plan was unnecessary. 150 Species recovery plans had a
positive effect on species recovery. As shown in Figure 5, species with
plans were doing much better than those without plans. Of those spe-
cies with adequate information, 57.3%, 40.0%, and 2.7% of the 110
species without a recovery plan were declining, stable, and improving,
respectively, as opposed to 41.3%, 42.2%, and 16.6% of the 441 spe-
cies with a recovery plan. These distributions differed significantly. 151
Across all species, the existence of a plan shifted 16% from declining
status to stable and improving, with the bulk of the shift to improving.
This effect persisted even when the length of time that species were
listed was controlled for.152 Perhaps more importantly, the existence
of a recovery plan, more so than other factors, shifted species status to
improving. Only three of the seventy-seven improving species lacked
a recovery plan.
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The FWS had both designated critical habitat and adopted a spe-
cies recovery plan for ninety-nine (11.9%) species. Of these, twenty-
150 The 17 exempt species were excluded from the analysis.
151 X2(2) = 17.37, p < .001. Of the eight extinct species, five had recovery plans and
three were considered exempt. A greater percentage of the species without recovery plans
had an unknown status (110 out of 220, or 50.0%) than of the species with recovery plans
(152 out of 598, or 25.4%). X2(1) = 59.76, p < .001.
152 Among species that had a known status and were not extinct, those with a recovery
plan were listed longer (10.3 years) than those without one (2.9 years). t(635) = 18.47, p<
.001. The semi-partial correlation for the effect of having a recovery plan, controlled for
the number of years that species were listed, on the binary variable that distinguished de-
clining species from stable and improving species was .002, and was not significant. F(1,
548) = 0.57, p > .5. The semi-partial correlation for the effect of having a recovery plan,
controlled for the number of years that species were listed, on the binary variable that
distinguished between stable and improving species was .018, and was significant. Al,
303) = 6.05, p < .025.
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six had an unknown status and two were extinct. Table 3 shows that
the remainder of these species were doing fairly well; only about one
in three was in decline.
TABLE 3: EFFECT OF CRITICAL HABITAT AND RECOVERY PLANS
ON SPECIES STATUS
Level of Protection Percent of Known Species Total Known Species
Habitat Plan Impr. Stable Decl.
No No 2.9 88.2 58.8 102
No Yes 17.8 40.0 42.7 370
Yes No 0.0 62.5 37.5 8
Yes Yes 12.7 53.5 33.8 71
Table 3 also shows the effects of critical habitat and recovery plans
separately. Adopting a recovery plan significantly improved the status
of species that did not have critical habitat.153 Even among species
that had critical habitat, a recovery plan appeared to add some benefit
by shifting species from stable to improving status, but this trend was
not significant.'5 4 The lack of statistical significance probably resulted
from the small number of species (eight) having critical habitat desig-
nated but no recovery plan. Likewise, although designating critical
habitat for species that lacked a recovery plan stabilized 24% more
species, due to a small sample size the effect was not significant. 155
Finally, designating critical habitat shifted 14% of these species from
declining to stable, which was a marginally significant effect. 5 6 In
sum, designating critical habitat and adopting a recovery plan both
had independent beneficial effects on species status. Critical habitat
moved species out of decline; recovery plans allowed species to
improve.
4. The Effects of Economic Conflicts
Pressure from economic development harmed species. The re-
covery efforts of 204 listed species (24.4%) were identified as having a
conflict with economic development. Among species with a known
status that were not extinct, 54.6%, 31.9%, and 13.5% of the 163 spe-
cies facing economic conflicts were declining, stable, and improving,
respectively, versus 40.1%, 46.4%, and 13.6% of the 397 species not
facing such conflicts-a statistically significant difference. 157
153 j 2(2) = 16.17, p< .001.
154 X2(2) = 1.15, p >.5.
155 X2(2) = 1.92, p > .25.
156 j2(2) = 4.49, p <.11.
157 z 2(2) = 11.25, p < .01. Of the eight extinct species, only one was noted as facing an
economic conflict. A greater proportion of the species not facing economic conflicts had
an unknown status (227 out of 631 species, or 36.0%) than those that did face such con-
flicts (40 out of 204 species, or 19.6%). j 2(1) = 18.99, p < .001.
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Although economic conflicts did not alter the percentage of species
identified as improving, conflicts caused a 15% shift from stable status
to declining status. 158
Further analysis revealed that critical habitat designation did not
mitigate the adverse impact of economic conflicts. As shown in Table
4a, economic conflict had a significant, adverse impact among species
without critical habitat. Although this effect was not significant
among species with critical habitat, the trend was evident; economic
conflicts shifted approximately 19% of species from stable and im-
proving to declining status. This was a greater shift than that observed
among species without critical habitat. The lack of significance proba-
bly resulted from the relatively small sample size.
TABLE 4a: EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONFLICT AND CRITICAL HABITAT
ON SPECIES STATUS
Statistics for Effect
Percent of Known Species Total of Econ. Conflict
Critical Economic Known
Habitat Conflict Impr. Stable Decl. Species X2 (2) p-value
No No 14.1 44.1 41.8 354 10.41 p<.01
Yes 13.6 28.8 57.6 125
Yes No 9.3 65.1 25.6 43 4.38 p>.10
Yes 13.2 42.1 44.7 38
Recovery plans exhibited a similar pattern. As shown in Table 4b,
among species with recovery plans, economic conflicts shifted 11.5%
of species into decline, which was significant. Among species without
recovery plans, economic conflicts shifted 18.5% of species into de-
cline, which was not significant. Once again, the failure to reach a
significant effect among the species without a recovery plan may have
resulted from the small number of observations.
TABLE 4b: EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONFLICT AND RECOVERY PLAN
ON SPECIES STATUS
Statistics for Effect
Percent of Known Species Total of Econ. Conflict
Recovery Economic Known
Plan Conflict Impr. Stable Dec. Species e'(2) p-value
No No 2.8 46.5 50.7 71 3.62 P>.10
Yes 2.6 28.2 69.2 39
Yes No 16.4 45.6 38.1 318 6.05 p<.05
Yes 17.1 33.3 49.6 123
158 Species facing economic conflicts were listed longer on average (9.5 years) than
those that did not face such conflicts (8.0 years). t(346) = 2.61, p < .01. Thus, the de-
graded condition of species facing conflicts cannot have resulted from fewer years of
listing.
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5. Extinctions and Recoveries
Since 1973, seven species have been removed from the lists due
to extinction.' 59 Another eight species that are probably extinct re-
main listed, awaiting final confirmation of their fate.160 Thus, a total
of fifteen extinctions may be said to have occurred among listed spe-
cies. At least six are believed to have been extinct before the Act was
passed,1 1 and the rest were probably already in serious decline. Nev-
ertheless, the conclusion is unmistakable-extinctions have occurred
in spite of the Act. By contrast, the FWS has declared eight species
recovered to the point that protection is no longer needed. 162
Although some of these successes may not have resulted from the
Act's influence, the existence of some recoveries of listed species sug-
gests that the Act can be successful. 163
III
DISCUSSION
The data clearly demonstrate that endangered and threatened
species are better off with the Act than they would be without it. They
undermine the conclusions that the Act's mandates stretch resources
in a manner harmful to biodiversity and that it creates perverse incen-
tives that overwhelm its benefits. Each aspect of the Act's protec-
tion-listing, designating critical habitat, and adopting a species
recovery plan-benefits listed species. In short, the Act works.
Listing appears to have turned the fortunes of about half of the
species it protects. 164 Although nearly half of all listed species remain
in decline, virtually all species are in decline when originally listed.
Most remain in decline for the first year after listing, but as time
passes, species populations stabilize and even improve. 165 Each year
of protection under the Act improves the prospects for listed spe-
cies. 166 A year of listing turns the fortunes of three out of every 200
listed species. In addition to demonstrating the benefits of the Act to
biodiversity, this study shows that analyzing the distribution of species
status at a single point in time undervalues the Act. Because the FWS
159 See FWS REPORT, 1994, supra note 89, at 32.
160 See supra tbl. 1.
161 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 240.
162 This statistic was taken from the FWS's endangered species World Wide Web page.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Recovery Program for Endangered and Threatened Species (last
modified Jan. 1995) <http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/factshts.html>.
163 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 240-41.
164 See supra Part H.B.1.
165 FWS REPORT, 1994, supra note 89, at 15. It is possible that over time, the FWS
merely discovers thriving populations of listed species, -but there is no evidence in these
data that would either support or refute such a theory.
166 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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continuously adds species that are in decline, summary statistics will
tend to understate the Act's positive impact. The trends over time
indicate that although many species remain at risk of extinction, the
biodiversity glass is half full, not half empty.
Among listed species, those designated as endangered fared
worse than those designated as threatened. 167 Because the FWS's reg-
ulations extend comparable protection to both endangered and
threatened species, differences between these groups imply only that
the FWS categorizes species properly. The lack of a difference sug-
gests that complaints about the FWS's classification procedures 168 are
irrelevant to species survival.
Designation of critical habitat appeared to benefit species, but
the evidence for this proposition was weak.169 Species that had critical
habitat designated were 11% less likely to be in decline, but the effect
was only marginally significant. Furthermore, some of this benefit was
due to the confounding of critical habitat designation with the length
of time on the list. The length of time that a species had enjoyed
critical habitat designation also did not predict an improved status.
Moreover, critical habitat did not seem to mitigate the adverse effects
of economic conflicts on species. This latter analysis may have been
expecting too much from the critical habitat designation, however,
because critical habitat does not implicate private parties, who are the
sources of economic conflict. 170 In sum, the data do support the con-
clusion that critical habitat benefits species, but the effect is not large.
Species recovery plans did further species recovery. Although the
existence of a recovery plan was closely associated with the length of
time species were listed, recovery plans clearly benefitted species, even
when the length of time that species were protected was controlled. 171
In fact, recovery plans appeared to be the primary mechanism that set
species on the road to recovery. Virtually all improving species had
recovery plans. Listing and designating critical habitat stabilized spe-
cies populations, and recovery plans facilitated improvement.
The data also revealed some imperfections and inadequacies in
the Act. Clearly, the fact that half of all species remain in decline can
be viewed as evidence of the Act's inadequacies. Because species can-
not decline indefinitely without incurring a substantial risk of extinc-
tion, the Act's inability to prevent such decline among certain species
is more evidence of its failure. Furthermore, although the Act is sup-
167 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
168 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 33, at 286, 287-89 (commenting upon the occasional
inability of the FWS to accurately classify species as Endangered or Threatened).
169 See supra Part H.B.2.
170 Section 7(a) (2) forbids "federal agencies" from destroying critical habitat, but
makes no reference to private parties. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (1994).
171 See supra Part II.B.3.
[Vol. 82:356
NOAHBY TlE NUMBERS
posed to protect species from economic pressures, species facing eco-
nomic conflicts were more likely to be in decline.172 Designating
critical habitat did not ameliorate this problem, but because critical
habitat only affects federal agencies, it should not have been expected
to. More troubling was the failure of recovery plans to mitigate the
impact of economic pressure. Even if section 9 fails to shield species
from private economic activity, the steps in the recovery plans are" sup-
posed to ensure species survival through active conservation and
habitat acquisition programs. Although these plans seem to benefit
species overall, lack of funding may make it impossible for the recov-
ery plans to buffer species from economic activity. Overall, the Act
provides species with neither a completely effective shield nor a signif-
icant buffer against economic activities.
The fifteen known extinctions must also be regarded as a failure
of the Act. Although some of them probably occurred before 1973,
and others may have occurred among species that were already in a
serious state of decline before 1973, some transpired in spite of the
Act. 73 The Act clearly has allowed some extinctions, and will proba-
bly continue to allow more in the future. In addition to the failures
among the listed species,, some unlisted species may have been extir-
pated before they could be listed.' 74 Others may have been listed only
after the populations had dwindled to a point where recovery is now
impossible. 175 Although it does benefit species, the Act is an imper-
fect guarantor of species survival.
The analysis presented in this Article reveals the real future of
endangered species in the United States. If the Act remains in its
present form, and current trends continue, the status of listed species
can be expected to improve. Ten years hence, the percentage of cur-
rently listed species in decline will drop from roughly one-half to
about one-third. 176 This beneficial trend would likely be furthered by
continuing to designate critical habitat and to develop recovery
plans.177 If all 835 non-clam species on the list had both, it can be said
172 See supra Part H.B.4.
17S See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 240.
174 See supra note 69.
175 Wilcove et al., supra note 70, at 88.
176 This estimate was obtained by extending the regression of the status of species on
the number of years a species has been listed, as described supra note 142. This regression
demonstrated that each year of listing moves 1.5% more species out of decline. Applying
the statistic to the current percentage of declining species among species with a known
status that are not extinct, 44.3%, and multiplying by 10, yields the prediction that 29.3%
will be in decline in the year 2004. This analysis makes several assumptions-most notably,
that the rate of improvement has been linear over the past two decades and that this trend
will continue precisely as it has.
177 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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that today only roughly one-third would be in decline. 178 If all 835
species remain on the list for another ten years each and each obtains
a recovery plan and critical habitat, 81.2% will be stable or improv-
ing.179 On the downside, because a large number of species undoubt-
ably will remain in decline for some period of time, extinctions will
continue, and may even increase. In sum, however, the Act saves spe-
cies, and will continue to do so if it remains in place.
Thus, the data analyzed in this Article undermine Mann and
Plummer's theory that the Act's mandate to protect all species
stretches resources so thin that none are protected, and that perverse
incentives created by restrictions against private parties overwhelm
any benefits the Act confers. Indeed, the data support the NRC's con-
clusion that the Act has "undoubtedly protected some species from
extinction." 80 The results of this study do, however, support a milder
version of the resource allocation hypothesis. That is, even if re-
sources are not currently stretched too thinly to have any effect, they
may be stretched to an inefficient degree. Species are paying a price
for the lack of resources needed to fully implement the Act. Despite
the fact that the Act requires critical habitat' 8 ' and recovery plans 82
to be created for all species, and despite the fact that both protections
benefit species,'8 3 598 of the 835 species (71.6%) have recovery plans,
110 species (13.2%) have critical habitat, and only 99 species (11.9%)
have both. 84 Clearly, the lack of resources prevents the Act from be-
ing all that it can be. The failure to designate habitat and to adopt
recovery plans jeopardizes species. As noted above, if the FWS desig-
nated both critical habitat and recovery plans for all threatened spe-
cies, the number of species in decline would drop to less than one-
third. Although Mann and Plummer's hypothesis that attempting to
protect all protects none is clearly wrong, attempting to protect all
without adequate funding exposes some species that could otherwise
be saved to the risk of extinction.
Species that are in danger of extinction, but are not yet protected
by the Act, are at even greater risk. The lack of resources to gather
the information necessary to list species leaves perhaps as many as
178 See supra tbl. 3.
179 Cf Houck, supra note 33, at 307-15 (questioning the effectiveness of critical habitat
and the FWS's view that critical habitat designation is essential to an endangered species'
survival). This estimate stated uses, as a baseline rate of species decline, the rate from
species that have both critical habitat and a recovery plan, 33.8%, as reported supra tbl. 3.
180 NRC REPORT, supra note 84, at 198.
181 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
182 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (1994).
183 See supra Part II.B.2-3.
184 See supra tbl. 3.
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three thousand species that need protection off of the list. 18 5 The
status of these species is largely unknown, but.given that recently
listed species are nearly all in decline, many of these species are in
jeopardy. Arguably, some of these species could be saved if the FWS
obtains more resources, or if it concentrates on a smaller subset of
species.
Mann and Plummer fail to precisely define an alternative system
for the reallocation of resources, but they do assert that the Act
should account for the costs of protecting species as well as for the
value of individual species.' 8 6 As to cost, they suggest that protection
of species might give way when the cost of doing so would be ex-
tremely high, such as when the species resides on valuable private
property that is ripe for development. 187 Presumably, sacrificing the
golden-cheeked warbler in suburban Austin would free up resources
to promote more efficient conservation of a nearby wildlife refuge,
where a dozen other listed species are located.' 8  As to the value of
species, Mann & Plummer assert that some measure of a species' con-
tribution to social welfare should enter into the calculus for determin-
ing which ones to protect. For example, species that attract tourists,
provide a valuable food source, or have medicinal potential would be
given higher priority. 18 9 Mann and Plummer sprinkle examples of
costly measures taken to protect unattractive "cold and slimy" species
throughout their book in a persuasive technique to support such a
priority system. 190 They contend that the Act would be more efficient,
as well as better reflect society's true preferences, if such an ordering
were implemented. 19 1
To be fair to the Act, it does provide the FWS with some flexibility
in allocating its resources. At every stage of decision-making, listing,
designating critical habitat, and adopting (and funding) a species re-
covery plan, the FWS performs a brand of triage. Unlisted species
facing a sufficient threat mayjustify an emergency listing.192 Likewise,
although all species are supposed to have critical habitat designated
185 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT No. 90-98,
AuDrT REPoRT THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 6 (1990). The FWS strongly disputes
this statistic, however. As of August 1996, the FWS has identified 182 candidate species
(that will probably be listed at some future date) and 243 proposed species (that may be
listed at some future date), all of which are in need of protection. See CandidatesforEndan-
gered Species Act Protection: 1996 Notice of Review (visited Jan. 25, 1997). <http://
www.fws.gov/-9rendspp/norqa.htmI>.
186 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 143-45.
187 Id. at 208-10.
188 See id. at 208-09.
189 See id at 119-24.
190 See, e.g., id. at 3-27 (discussing conservation of the burying beetle).
191 Id. at 219-21.
192 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1994).
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within one year of listing,193 the FWS doles out critical habitat designa-
tion only sparingly.194 Moreover, development and funding of recov-
ery plans are supposed to flow to species "that are most likely to
benefit."' 95 It is true that the FWS is not allowed by statute to favor
one class or type of species over another,196 but it does have leeway to
distribute its resources to those species with the greatest need.
The data presented here refute the underlying premise of Mann
and Plummer's proposals: that the Act is an outright failure as it
stands. The Act does pretty well without making intentional sacrifices
of species. Instead, the data analyzed above counsel for a realignment
of agency priorities. The first step in protection-listing-has the
greatest marginal impact on species. Critical habitat and recovery
plans provide a far more modest benefit. Rather than reducing the
number of protected species and focusing efforts instead on designat-
ing critical habitat or funding recovery plans, if the FWS concentrated
on simply listing more species, the Act would have a greater overall
impact on biodiversity. Thus, rather than being stretched too thinly,
the resources available to the FWS are not stretched enough. Adding
species not already protected would confer the most benefit on bi-
odiversity as a whole.
Alternatively, the data do support increased funding for the en-
dangered species program. Throughout Noah's Choice, Mann and
Plummer treat the FWS's endangered species budget as a fixed mea-
sure of the nation's commitment to protecting biodiversity.197 If the
Act fails to guard species from extinction, then their analysis makes
sense-why spend more on a failed program? But money spent on
the Act does benefit species. Thus, it may be that spending more
would be socially efficient. If the current budget meets or exceeds the
point at which spending another dollar in species protection would
yield less than one dollar in social benefits, then Mann and Plummer
are correct. The data suggest, however, that listing more species,
designating more critical habitat, and adopting more species recovery
plans would work to avert some extinctions. Given society's general
193 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6) (1994).
194 See Houck, supra note 33, at 302-07.
195 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1) (A) (1994). The FWS describes its priority system in some
detail in its 1990 Report. FWS REPORT, 1990, supra note 89, at 8. The system incorporates
three variables, degree of threat, recovery potential, and taxonomic subdivision, respec-
tively, in order of importance of each variable. I.
196 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1) (A) (1994) (recovery plans must be created "without re-
gard to taxonomic classification").
197 MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 2, at 212-15. The real "budget" for protecting bi-
odiversity should, of course, include the costs that the Act imposes on private parties. As
Mann and Plummer note, "[w]hen we pick nature, we must recognize the human losses
.... " Id. at 214.
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interest in protecting all species from extinction, 198 there appears to
be much more to be gained, in social terms, by greater implementa-
tion of the Act.
To be sure, the statute incurs costs other than the FWS's budget.
Although the data analyzed above show that, from the perspective of
its own budget, listing more species is the cheapest way for the FWS to
protect biodiversity, this strategy would add to the costs that the Act
imposes on private parties. The use of federal money to implement
recovery plans, and particularly the land acquisition aspects of many
plans, minimizes the costs imposed on private parties. These data, as
well as this study, take no position on the relative fairness of section 9
as opposed to public acquisition of land. Rather, they indicate that
either program will benefit listed species. Although Mann and Plum-
mer's observation that the Act has costs is correct, their assessment of
its benefits is wrong. Whatever the private costs of the Act, it clearly
has a positive effect on biodiversity.
CONCLUSION: COSTS AND BENEFITS
Even if the Act benefits endangered species, it is not clear that
these benefits are worth its costs or that the Act could not be more
efficient. The Act does impose costs on both the federal government
and private parties. The budget for the endangered species program
for fiscal 1996 stands at $85.7 million, 199 but this is just the tip of the
iceberg of costs. Taking federal lands out of economically productive
uses in order to protect biodiversity costs jobs; restrictions on habitat
modification impose uncalculated costs on private parties. It may well
be that our society does not truly value insects, clams, snails, or plants
enough to allocate the resources necessary to preserve these species.
It may be that only megafauna, like grizzly bears, bald eagles, and grey
wolves, merit protection. These issues are beyond the scope of this
Article, but the statistical analysis reported above shows that the Act is
not easily dismissed as useless. If it remains in its present form, most
of the listed species will be preserved. The claim that the Act fails to
protect endangered species only clouds the more complicated ques-
tions that the Act raises. Deciding to live with or without the 1,069
currently listed species is the ultimate decision our society must face.
The Act provides us with the tools to protect many of them. We must
make many difficult choices that arise from the use of this law, but
only in full light of the knowledge that it has benefits as well as costs.
198 Cf. id. at 133-34 (discussing human beings' stubborn refusal to embrace the "com-
pelling logic" that some species must die in the name of progress).
199 The fiscal 1995 budget allocated $95.5 million for the FWS's endangered species
program. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Summary: Funding for the Department of the Interior
Under the Omnibus 1996Appropriations Act (visitedJan. 25, 1997). <http://www.ios.doi.gov/
budget/96ntAppropHisLhtml>.
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